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Abstract
The paper discusses traceability as part of information management in fruit supply chains of Emilia-
Romagna, Italy. A review of the rules in use for traceability distinguishes between a proper
traceability and a traceability plus (T+), embedded of many value attributes. Elements of
competitive strategy, considered in the analysis of fruit supply chains of Emilia-Romagna, try to
demonstrate that not only strategic but also operative choices determine the way a single firm or
filière manages traceability and information issues. Applications of such elements to buyers and
sellers selection as well as to competing retailers of the fruit supply chain, verify the hypothesis.
Key words: Traceability, Information management, Fruit supply chain.
JEL classification: L1, Q13
1. Introduction
The adoption of traceability systems in firms of the fruit supply chain, may be referred to the
statutory and voluntary law in force or to a more comprehensive idea of traceability, going beyond
the law requirements. We call it ‘traceability plus’, referring to a non-standardized concept
embedded with many other product/brand attributes, included in the processes of selective
collection and release of information.
The focus is then shifted to the overall information flow across the supply chain.
The field study interested the fruit supply chain in Emilia-Romagna and was aimed at identifying
different supply chain management practices, including information collection and release.
Issues related either to organizational performances or to competitive advantage strategies came
into play and were discussed with key informants.
The paper is organized as follows: first, a problem statement related to the legal pluralism
conditions on traceability and the general assumption that traceability is able to create value if it
goes beyond statutory norms are exposed; then, objectives, methodology and theoretical framework
applied are described, and the interpretation of traceability as an information management tool is
discussed. Finally, the results of the case-studies analysis and some final comments are presented.International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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2. Legal pluralism for traceability: a problem statement
A plurality of legal systems refers to traceability issues: statutory law, voluntary standards and
contractual agreements, firm strategies. The basic interpretation of traceability derives from the
statutory definition, while a number of enhanced versions of traceability, adopted on a voluntary
basis and that we may call here traceability ‘plus’ (T+), are put in place and communicated to
consumers. Each firm has to put in place the traceability defined by statutory law, at European,
national, and regional level (e.g. EC Reg. 178/2002). In addition, there are many T+
implementation models,  differently defined through voluntary norms (e.g. ISO 9001:2000, ISO
22000:2005, UNI 10939:2001, UNI 11020:2002, BRC, IFS), and voluntary company standards.
Moreover, a firm can enrich traceability with elements beyond contractual agreements or voluntary
certification. In Figure 1, a diagram shows the reciprocal integration of such ruling levels.
As minimum requirement of safety control systems required by law, traceability should not be
communicated as a firm added value. On the other hand, a traceability system is able to create
added value as far as it goes beyond statutory norms.
3. Objectives
With respect to fruit supply chains in the Emilia-Romagna Region, we hypothesize that the
adoption and management of T+ system is part either of the operational or strategic information
management, thus being included in the organizational performance or in the competitive strategy
of a firm or filière.
Moreover, we hypothesize that part of the costs associated to T+, or to supply chain information
flows are transaction costs. They are source of many inefficiencies and a better co-ordination
between firms could reduce them.
4. Methodology
Semi-structured in-depth interviews have been carried out with 17 key informants. Among them,
executives from 4 producers, 6 traders (3 co-operatives, 3 wholesalers), 3 major retailers, 3 small
retailers and a catering company, the responsible for traceability standards of a certification agencyTraceability as part of Competitive Strategy in the Fruit Supply Chain
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and the manager of a system technology firm were represented. All the interviewees operate at a
decision making level. Being the theme: ‘supply chain management practices’, interview questions
were standardized around 6 sub- themes (Dibb et al., 1997). The sub themes were:
1. Information about the firm;
2. Product Management (processing and logistic);
3. Information Management;
4. Purchasing needs versus company capabilities;
5. Co-ordination issues;
6. Compliance with other management systems and voluntary certifications.
As coming from a small sample, all the evidence resulting from the interviews and observations
were presented (Yin, 1994) and discussed with reference to literature. Moreover, it has been looked
at how different strategies of 3 competing large retailers influence operative decisions about
information and traceability management according to the Porter’s framework for competitive
analysis.
5. Theoretical background
The theoretical background founds on: supply chain management (SCM) practices (Tan et al.,
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2002), competitive analysis (Stern and Reve, 1980; Porter, 1980) as well as transaction costs theory
(Williamson, 1975; Barzel, 1982).
SCM has been defined to explicitly recognize the strategic nature of coordination between trading
partners; in particular, we looked at what were the level of information sharing and the quality of
information shared. The level of information sharing refers to the extent to which critical and
proprietary information is communicated to one’s supply chain partner (Monczka et al., 1998); the
significance of information sharing impact on SCM depends on the quality of information shared:
what, when, how and with whom it is shared (Holmberg, 2000).
Various theories offer insights on specific aspects or perspectives of SCM, such as industrial
organization and associated transaction cost analysis. Here we refer either to industrial relations,
through the Porter’s framework for buyers and sellers analysis, considering the purchasing needs
versus company capabilities, or to transaction cost analysis, in particular to the so called ex-post
transaction costs including coordination and control issues (Cheung, 1987).
Shared information can vary from strategic to tactical in nature and from information about logistics
activities to general market and customer information (Mentzer et al. 2000). Selective release of
information about itself is a crucial point the firm has to consider either to communicate
commitment, to promote new products or to disclose plans or intentions (Porter, 1980, p. 107). Such
information selection including the T+ management is not only part of tactical decisions but is
included in the competitive strategy of a firm.
As sharing data with other parties within the supply chain can be a source of competitive advantage
(Tompkins and Ang, 1999), so inaccurate or delayed information cause dysfunctions, as
information moves along the supply chain (Mason-Jones, 1997). Divergent interests and
opportunistic behavior and informational asymmetries across supply chain affect the quality of
information (Feldmann and Müller, 2003). Information disclosure is perceived as a loss of power,
thus organizations are reluctant to give more than minimal information (Berry et al., 1994).
Ensuring the quality of the shared information becomes a critical aspect of effective SCMTraceability as part of Competitive Strategy in the Fruit Supply Chain
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(Feldmann and Müller, 2003).
6. Discussion of findings: 3 sub filière identification
The results of interviews and observation were elaborated according to the sub-themes matrix. As
result of the matrix as a whole, three fruit supply chains have been differentiated looking at the
operators involved, the actors driving transactions, the management of information, the firm
underlying strategy. The supply chain we called “producer driven” sees at its end small retailers
selecting their suppliers on the basis of the price set at the wholesale fruit market. The supply chain
we called “large retailer driven” entails large retailers setting the supply chain standards. The
“ho.re.ca driven” supply chain includes, as driving actors, hotel, restaurants and catering
companies.
The research findings pointed out a possible categorization of information produced and shared
across the supply chain.
6.1 Traceability as information management
The interviews findings showed that the choices regarding which information to include in the
traceability system, and which resources and tools to invest for such a system management, are
based on several elements. Internal factors (related to the firm mission, to structural, technological
and balance constraints), the type of operators involved and their linkages to each other, as well as
macro-environmental characteristics (legislation, competitive environment), influence the selection
and processing of information. The resulting information flows obey to specific requirements and
objectives (Figure 2).
Economic constraints. The investments are essential to manage highly diversified requirements
and non standardized techniques for information transfer.
Technological limits are strictly dependent on economic constraints; technology as well as
collecting information about available and suitable technologies, is costly to the firm.
Most of the information managed has to comply with legislation constraints.
Asking and transferring information are strictly connected to the firm strategies and mission.International Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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Traceability will consequently bear different connotations, functional to the kind of message a firm
desires to communicate to its target.
Staff motivation and training is considered as strategic since traceability is often regarded as a
further burden of costs and work to producers.
Co-ordination forms, their complexity and the firm willingness to create long run relationships
with other actors of the chain, heavily affect the opportunities to collect and manage information.
Due to the above-mentioned constraints and factors, every firm or supply chain has to define which
strategies drive its activity and which kind of good or service it is going to provide to the market.
Any supply is identifiable as a group of attributes/values, satisfying certain customers’ needs
(Maslow, 1943; Gutman, 1982; Lambin, 2004 p.82). Information and the capability to manage or
communicate it, is part of a firm supply. Traceability assumes different “values” depending on the
information it transfers. A possible classification of information is following.
“Strategic” information is a mix of information created to highlight, implement and communicate
the firm mission. Strategic information can include:
- product quality information, the most complex and heterogeneous information mix that includes
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the specific quality concept chosen by the firm or supply chain but relates also to nutritional
value, modes of production, uniqueness of the product;
- “accessory” information, increasing the service level provided by the firm and generating value
to the client. This information may not be essential but it differentiates a firm from another, a
supply chain from another;
- ethical (social or environmental) information, considered when a firm prefers to emphasize its
driving “strategy” more than a product or service characteristics. Often, this group of information
is communicated as compliance with voluntary norms (e.g. SA 8000, EMAS, ISO 14001).
“Operational” information. The firm may choose to manage only the information useful to allow
its existence or to create a more effective and clear relationship between operators in the supply
chain. It would include:
- compulsory information, required by law. This group of information should not create any added
value to clients. However, enriching the compulsory information with additional elements, the
consumer who may not know law prescriptions, may perceive such elements as value adding;
- hygienic-sanitary safety information is required either to comply with statutory law or to
communicate a particular attention to sanitary aspects. Compulsory standards can be taken ‘as is’
or set stricter.
6.2 Information management in the three sub filière
Influences and linkages in the information management trough the three sub filière have been
described in figure 3. Bold arrows indicate a strong influence and linkage in the information
management, while hatching arrows indicate weaker influence and linkage.
Producer driven: the sub filière directed to traditional retailers is characterized by no further
collection nor transfer of information than that required by law. At date, farmers have to record
chemical treatments and fuel consumption on a ‘farm notebook’, however such a detailed
information is not required along the supply chain.
Large retailer driven: suppliers of large retailers comply with contractual arrangements thatInternational Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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include strict quality standards, time of delivery, field and laboratory analysis, etc. Retailers keep
and manage all information provided by suppliers exploiting products differentiation, and
communicating commercial images not always related to characteristics of the physical product or
the production process. They filter information and lead consumers to trust the retailer itself and its
private label.
Ho.Re.Ca. driven: information about traceability is selected by producers and wholesalers; it
remains to the supplier who ensures the fulfillment of the company purchasing needs. Essential
information is available, rarely beyond the law compliance.
6.3 Purchasing needs versus company capabilities (uncertainties in choosing the right
supplier or client)
The matching of buyers’ purchasing needs with the company capability to fulfill them, is essential
to the transaction: the more a firm reach a product specificity, according to its buyer’s needs, the












Large retailer  driven
Ho.Re.Ca. driven
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more it will be favored among competitors (Porter, 1980). Such a specialisation implies also
specific investments, then sunk costs as well as barriers to entry and exit.
Producer driven: the matching of buyers’ purchasing needs happens through the market and the
choice of the product is made from time to time.
Ho.Re.Ca. driven: these actors at the retailing stage ask for good looking products at a reasonable
price. Product customization or modification happens at the Ho.Re.Ca. level, and the importance of
the produce to the buyer’s final product relates to the product availability more than to its
characteristics. In case of scarcity, the cost for getting the product at the right time can be high.
Large Retailer driven: the survey showed that large retailers select suppliers on the basis of their
capabilities to satisfy requirements. At date, capable fruit suppliers are few. In the surveyed fruit
supply chain, it has been observed that large producers and co-operatives consider large retailers as
good buyers due to the large amount of produce purchased with respect to seller total sales, the
steadiness of order flow for purposes of planning and logistics, and reliable (even if late) payments.
Retailers behave opportunistically: no extra remuneration is agreed to producers for their high
standard.
6.4 Product management
Producer driven: at the picking stage, the production unit is identified with pallets or bins
connected to the producer’s name or ID-code. Wholesalers either independently or through the
wholesale market, collect the product and provide it to small retailers.
Ho.Re.Ca. driven: Ho.Re.Ca. is served through wholesalers and a certain steadiness of order flow
is guaranteed.
Large Retailer driven: at the level of wholesalers or co-operatives (refrigeration, processing,
storage), pre-calibration and selection stages cause the splitting and the mixing up of original lots
and the creation of new ones. Finally, any package and pallet is identified by its ID-code, date and
time of processing. The survey revealed that retailers may decide to send back produce to suppliers
notifying it as ‘non conform’ and putting the burden of shipping and re-customization costs onInternational Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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suppliers. Similarly, the producer may resend the refused product to the same client at the following
delivery. These are cases of inefficiencies.
6.5 Transaction costs/Cost of servicing
Transaction costs include: order size, direct selling versus selling through distributors, required lead
time, steadiness of order flow for purposes of planning and logistics, shipping costs, selling cost,
need for customization or modification.
Producer driven: the level of shopping, transaction or negotiating costs is normally the same at
every order and would increase in case of switching from a supplier to another. There is no
steadiness of order flow, thus planning and logistics are very difficult. The need for product
customization is negligible.
Ho.Re.Ca. driven: the Ho.Re.Ca. companies propensity to exert bargaining power is not much in
demanding low prices as in the threat they pose to backward integration. Indeed, the Ho.Re.Ca.
companies are trying to reduce their transaction costs by increasing the number of own distribution
centers, thus substituting the wholesalers.
Large retailer driven: while the volume of product purchased is generally high, it may not be
reached through few orders but through many operations, which generate contractual and shipping
costs. Complying with the parameter requested by retailers brings further costs to suppliers
(managing more information than required by statutory law; using lab-instruments, training
production operators, monitoring their activity).
6.6 Co-ordination issues
Through the different stages of the fruit supply chain, control costs are born by different operators
to solve uncertainties. The co-operative or warehouse technical staff control the produce quality,
either in the field or at the warehouse. Retailers receive goods and carry out several controls to
verify the correspondence to the contractual agreements. Different retailers controlling the same
produce category in different ways, create a relevant source of inefficiencies in the system as a
whole. Costs include physical samples, laboratories of analysis, transportation, the return of unsoldTraceability as part of Competitive Strategy in the Fruit Supply Chain
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produce, labor cost, instruments. Such costs, are due to two main factors:
1)  distrust of information transferred and of controlling operations;
2)  lack of co-ordination between retailers.
Vertical co-ordination offers several incentives, many of which related to transaction cost reduction.
In the fruit supply chain, co-ordination forms are subject to limits imposed by the asset
characteristics. Particularly, uncertainties about the availability of the good and its quality, is too
risky for vertical co-ordination but stimulate horizontal integration. However, the physical
concentration of bulk quantities of non-homogeneous product does not imply their standardization.
Ward (1997) emphasises that co-ordinating with lower stages of the supply chain ensures access to
market information and allows to better plan the supply; whilst co-ordinating with higher stages of
the supply chain allows to influence the supply side to own specific needs. Barzel (1982) highlights
how convenient is monitoring during production the quality and sanitary attributes of produce, thus
reducing measurement and valuation costs at the time of purchasing it.
Farmers and co-operative managers interviewed agree that co-ordination brings to suppliers greater
opportunities to sell their products (Hayenga, 1996), allows a better risk and investment
management thanks to the attribution of single-step responsibilities.
As seen in the fruit supply chain, problematic to vertical integration is the combination of different
stages from the production to the distribution, which include a wide range of operations among
which there could be inefficiently operating ones (Buzzel, 1983). Obviously, external co-ordination,
cannot reduce internal inefficiencies of a single firm.
7. Competitive leverages of three “Retailer driven” supply chains
The differences noted between large retailers during the interviews justify a stronger interest
towards their internal strategy. The specificity of information collection and release by three
different retailers have been looked at under the light of competitive strategy.
The three major Italian retailers have been interviewed. They differ for the managerial structure: a
Consumers’ Co-operative, a Small retailers consortium and a sole corporation. Elements to analyzeInternational Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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these three competitors include: their current strategy, their capabilities due to their structure, their
assumptions about themselves, focusing on the control stages, and future goals.
The most strongly influential issues over traceability have been discussed, and are presented
Table 1. Comparison of current strategies among the large retail-driven case studies
Consumers Co-Operative Small Retailers Consortium Retail Sole Corporation
Particular attention to associates and
their participation to choices.
Private label strategy.
Diversification strategy on the basis of
price and quality control.
Social accountability.
Small retailers associated to provide a
better service.
Price and number of references
strategy.
Presence of private label.
High quality of product and service,
accountability to client.
Strong emphasis on the private label
for fresh fruit (100% of product).
Source: authors' elaboration
Table 2. Comparison of capabilities among the large retail-driven case studies
Consumers Co-Operative Small Retailers Consortium Retail Sole Corporation
a Capabilities: Number and Type of Fruit Suppliers
High number of suppliers (farmers
and co-ops). Centralized contract.
Direct orders by hypermarkets.
Many single orders.
High number of suppliers (farmers,
co-ops, wholesalers, traders) selected
on the basis of standardized supply.
Centralized contract.
Many single orders.
Low number of suppliers (Large
producers or wholesalers).
Only centralized purchase.
A good timing and logistic
management is required.
b Capabilities: Product Management
Common platforms.
First in – first out.
Common platforms.
First in – first out.
Total product management through
the firm warehouse (full-empty). The
private label product is packaged at
the point of sale.
c Capabilities: Information Management And The Scope For Traceability
For the private label product: high
quality standards and high number of
controls.
For other brands: few controls.
Lot management up to the
Distribution Center.
The supplier has to keep information
beyond the law level. The co-op feels
responsible to consumers.
Papery and computer support.
Broad contractual agreements signed
up between suppliers and the
consortium. Not very strict parameters
due to the diversified internal
structure of the consortium associates.
For the private label product,
information about the supply chain is
required.
Papery and computer support.
Information required to suppliers
coded depending on the product
characteristics (e.g. organic vs
conventional). Just compliance with
law required to suppliers. Traceability
is possible up to the corporation
storehouse, where the lots are mixed
up.
Information managed through IT
system.
Source: authors' elaborationTraceability as part of Competitive Strategy in the Fruit Supply Chain
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synoptically in Tables 1-3.
As general result, it was pointed out that the introduction of legislation on traceability changed very
little: structural and logistic characteristics of the corporation determine the supplier selection, the
product management and the information management. Strategic goals influence again the
information management, the level of control tests as well as the communication to clients.
8. Conclusions
Although the adoption of a traceability system is compulsory, many sort of ‘T+’ have been
identified as dependent upon the information flow across the supply chain.
The field study interested the fruit supply chain in Emilia-Romagna and was aimed at identifying
different strategic approaches within it. As result of the field research, three sub-filière were
distinguished, characterized by: different operators; information management; purchasing needs
versus company capability (staying for level of servicing and compliance to contractual
agreements); transaction cost, and opportunities for co-ordination. According to the interviewees
opinion, and information is an asset, information flow is shaped by the conditions constraining its
Table 3. Comparison of assumptions among the large retail-driven case studies
Consumers Co-Operative Small Retailers Consortium Retail Sole Corporation
a Assumptions (Held about itself and the Industry):Voluntary Certification – Control Tests
Suppliers voluntary certifications is
required or, at least, valued.
Relations regulated through
contractual agreements.
Safety as a pre-requisite.
Product analysis and control in several
phases (harvesting, storage,
processing, retailing).
Difficulties for product and
information standardization.
Lack of interest towards external
audit. The corporation considers itself
as sufficient to satisfy all the clients’
needs.
The product is analyzed and
customized at the retailing stage.
b Assumptions (Held about itself and the Industry): Communication (Able to create Added Value)
To increase trust in the firm strategy,
complete and clear information about
controls and suppliers is
communicated.
Little information to consumer.
Higher required trust in the brand and
the filière is required.
Little information to consumer,
emphasis on quality and the
production technique. Trust in the
brand from which the total value
derives is required.
Source: authors' elaborationInternational Association of Agricultural Economists Conference
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collection and its capability to create value according to firm organizational and strategic focuses. It
was pointed out that scarce co-ordination generates transaction costs and resource wastage, in
particular at the control stages.
Although through a small sample, and the adoption of a qualitative approach, both the hypotheses
of the research seem to be supported by the analysis: traceability is part of information management
which is included either in logistic or strategic issues; transaction costs arise and there is scope for
co-ordination across the supply chains.
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